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I. INTRODUCTION: RE-THINKING EARLY 
MODERN COMMON LAW 
Most histories of Early Modern English common law focus on a very specific set of individuals, namely Justices Edward 
Coke and Matthew Hale, Sir Francis Bacon, Sir Henry 
Finch, Sir John Doddridge, and-very recently-John 
Selden.i The focus is partly explained by the immense 
influence most of these individuals exercised upon 
the study and practice of common law during the 
seventeenth century.ii Moreover, according to J.W. 
Tubbs, such a focus is unavoidable because a great 
majority of common lawyers left no record of their 
thoughts.1 It is my contention that Tubbs’ view is 
unwarranted. Even if it is impossible to reconstruct 
the thoughts of a vast majority of common lawyers, 
there is no reason to limit our studies of common 
law to the aforementioned group of individuals. 
In fact, if we are to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of the place of common law in political 
and intellectual culture of the seventeenth century, it is 
necessary to move beyond the limits to which current 
historiography has confined itself. 
As it stands, current scholarship presents two 
i  See J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study 
of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century, A Reissue with 
a Retrospect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957, 1987); Glen 
Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English 
Political Thought, 1603-1642 (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1992); J.W. Tubbs, The Common Law Mind: Medieval and 
Early Modern Conceptions (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2000); Alan Cromartie, Sir Matthew Hale, 1609-1676: Law, Religion 
and Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), “The 
Constitutional Revolution: The Transformation of Political Culture in Early 
Stuart England,” Past & Present, 1999, 163 (1), 76-120, The Constitutionalist 
Revolution: An essay on the History of England, 1450-1642 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006); Reid Barbour, John Selden: Measures of 
the Holy Commonwealth in Seventeenth-Century England (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2003); Harold J. Berman, “The Origins of Historical 
Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 103, No. 
7(1994), 1651-1738; Allen D. Boyer, Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan Age 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
ii  Justice Matthew Hale, in particular, stands out for his influence on 
subsequent generations of lawyers. His views on marital rape were cited in 
court cases as recently as 1993. 
major problems. First, religion—the pivotal force 
that shaped nearly every aspect of life in seventeenth-
century England—has received very little attention in 
most accounts of common law. As I will show in the 
next section, either religion is not mentioned at all 
or treated as parallel to common law. In other words, 
historians have generally assumed a disconnect 
between religion and common law during this 
period. Even works that have attempted to examine 
the intersection of religion and common law have 
argued that the two generally existed in harmony 
or even as allies in service to political motives. 
The possibility of tensions between religion and 
common law has not been considered at all. Second, 
most historians have failed to consider emerging 
alternative ways in which seventeenth-century 
common lawyers conceptualized the idea of reason 
as a foundational pillar of English common law. 
Focused primarily on Sir Edward Coke’s Aristotelian 
idea of “artificial reason,” current scholarship 
does not address how the changing intellectual 
culture of seventeenth-century England might have 
transformed the ways in which common lawyers 
thought about reason and its relation to common law. 
As a result, it portrays common law as rather static. 
This essay addresses these shortcomings in 
the existing historiography by first suggesting 
that common law and religion did intersect in a 
complex way, and then challenging the idea that 
common law was static. Ultimately, it is important to 
consider religion and common law together and pay 
careful attention to how the idea of reason changed 
with time. It will accomplish this through an in-
depth examination of the career and writings of a 
particularly little-studied figure: John Sadler, Town 
Clerk of London and Master of Magdalene College, 
Cambridge. A prominent common lawyer, Sadler 
commanded respect and admiration from many 
of his contemporaries, including Oliver Cromwell 
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who invited him to become the Chief Justice of the 
Province of Munster, Ireland. In spite of Cromwell’s 
carefully measured plea, Sadler, perhaps excited 
by his prospects in England, refused the offer.2 
Nonetheless, the invitation does speak to Sadler’s 
stature. Munster was the largest and most settled 
of all the Irish provinces. The post of the Chief 
Justice of Munster, therefore, was one of the most 
important offices in the Irish administration. The fact 
that Cromwell offered it to the relatively young and 
inexperienced Sadler speaks volumes about the high 
regard in which Cromwell thought of Sadler.iii
Cromwell was not the only one who appreciated 
Sadler’s knowledge of the law. Appointed the Town 
Clerk of London in July 1649, Sadler was widely 
in demand for his legal expertise throughout the 
1650s. In March 1650, he was appointed to the High 
Court of Justice,iv and in January 1652, he served on 
the famous commission for law reform chaired by 
Justice Matthew Hale.3 Apart from being a lawyer, 
Sadler was also a renowned scholar of Hebrew and 
a prominent academic. A philo-semite, he was 
instrumental in arranging Menasseh Ben Israel’s visit 
to England in 1655. When Israel died, Sadler urged 
Richard Cromwell to provide financial assistance 
to Israel’s widow.4 Upon the Restoration, however, 
Sadler lost all of his offices and spent the rest of his 
life in obscurity until he died in 1674.
In spite of Sadler’s importance to his 
contemporaries, historians have largely neglected 
him. Several studies of the period mention him 
but only in passing. Historians of philo-semitism 
have taken note of him as an important part of the 
Cromwellian machinery that brought Menasseh 
Ben Israel to England and organized the famous 
Whitehall conference.5 He has also been described 
as perhaps the first proponent of the powerful idea 
that the people of England are direct descendants of 
the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel.6 Scholars of political 
thought have discussed his contribution to the 
defense of the Commonwealth in the aftermath of the 
execution of Charles I, and historians of the Hartlib 
Circle have casually mentioned him as a member 
of the group.7 Likewise, Christopher Hill wrote 
of Sadler as one who “experienced defeat” at the 
iii  At the same time, the letter might also indicate the reluctance of the legal 
establishment to get involved in the Irish campaign. I thank Professor Adrian 
Johns for bringing this to my attention. 
iv  The High Court of Justice was a special court created by the Rump 
Parliament for the trial of King Charles I. However, the name continued to be 
used for a number of other courts after 1649. 
Restoration in 1660 but did not examine his work in 
any detail.8 Sadler, therefore, has largely remained a 
marginal figure in most studies of the period.
Part of the neglect is to be explained by the fact 
that, unlike many of his contemporaries, Sadler did 
not leave behind any large collection of papers and 
writings. In 1666, the Fire of London ravaged his 
£5,000 house in Salisbury Court and very possibly 
destroyed most of his correspondence.9 Many 
historians have also been repulsed by the nature of 
his writings. Janelle Greenberg, Richard Greaves and 
Alan Cromartie have found his works to be “mind 
numbing”, “self indulgent” and “poorly organized”.10 
It is especially difficult to interpret Sadler’s tedious 
writings on biblical allegories and numbers. Claims 
that, beginning in the 1650s, Sadler grew mentally 
ill have hardly helped to change his image as a writer 
of incredibly obscure prose.11 While none of these 
criticisms is unfair, it does not follow that Sadler has 
little historiographical value. 
In rectifying this historiographical neglect 
and placing Sadler within the wider common law 
tradition, this essay makes two key arguments.v First, 
it argues that Sadler’s interpretation of common law 
and his religious beliefs were neither completely 
separate nor in harmony with each other; they did 
intersect but were at odds with each other. While 
common law led him to support and defend the 
newly established Commonwealth in 1649, his 
religious beliefs dictated that the means through 
which the Commonwealth had been established 
were unjustified. Even as he felt enthusiastic for the 
political changes around him, this enthusiasm was 
contained by the pacifism central to his religious 
beliefs. For Sadler, therefore, common law and 
religion worked in opposite directions. The result 
was a rather unusual position in which Sadler ended 
up supporting the ends, but not the means of the 
v  Due to my focus on common law and reason, I have refrained from 
discussing any of Sadler’s post-1649 writings that have little to say about 
common law. These include Olbia, The New Island Lately Discovered (1660), 
and Christ Under the Law (1664). Olbia tells the fictitious tale of a pilgrim 
stuck on the island of Olbia in modern-day Italy. It describes his distress about 
being left on the island alone after a shipwreck. The work then moves on to a 
discussion of the nature of grace and faith, the “Law of Love” and millenarian 
musings filled with an intense study of Biblical numbers to determine the 
precise date of the beginning of the millennium. Given that it was written 
right around the Restoration, it is tempting to read the work as a political 
allegory of some sort. However, direct evidence for any such interpretation 
is lacking. Christ Under the Law pursues the millenarian speculations further 
and argues that, bound by a contract to his devotees, Christ is bound to return. 
It is possible that, during the 1640s, Sadler wrote a number of other works. 
Several of these might have been short pamphlets. However, since many such 
works end with the initials “J.S.,” it is difficult to ascertain whether Sadler or 
John Streater or some other thinker with the same initials authored them. 
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Commonwealth. Second, with regard to reason and 
common law, it argues that Sadler’s conception of 
reason was radically different from that of many 
other common lawyers of his time. Rather than being 
Aristotelian along the lines of Justice Edward Coke’s 
“artificial reason,” it was primarily Platonic. Bred in 
an intellectual tradition that detested Aristotelian 
Scholasticism and looked towards Platonism as an 
alternative, Sadler stands out as an exemplar of how 
the intellectual transformations of the seventeenth 
century affected the idea of reason as it related to 
common law.
To this end, I begin section 2 with a discussion 
of the inadequate treatment of religion in common 
law historiography from Sir Herbert Butterfield 
(1944) to Alan Cromartie (2006). In section 3, I 
will explore the tensions between Sadler’s religious 
views and ideas about common law in his Rights 
of the Kingdom (1649). I will first examine how he 
arrived at authoring this intricate defense of the 
Commonwealth and then highlight the centrality 
of common law treatises to this defense. Next, 
I will look at the nature of his religious beliefs, 
particularly his millenarian convictions, and suggest 
that they led him to question his commitment to 
the Commonwealth, thereby bringing his religion 
and ideas of common law into conflict with 
each other. In section 4, I will move away from 
religion and begin with a discussion of the existing 
historiography on reason within the common law 
tradition. Next, focusing primarily on Sadler’s 1640 
work Masquarade Du Ciel (1640), I will highlight the 
Platonic nature of his idea of reason and situate it 
within his understanding of common law. The essay 
ends with a summary of the key arguments and their 
historiographical implications, and sketches out some 
directions for further research.
II. RELIGION AND COMMON LAW:  A MISSING 
LINK IN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
In 1940, as Germany waged war against 
England, Herbert Butterfield, then a lecturer at 
Cambridge, was intrigued by how often English 
leaders reminded their citizens of how the English 
could draw upon the past as a source of courage and 
inspiration in a time of crisis.12 Four years later, in 
The Englishman and his History (1944), he set out 
to better understand this powerful link between the 
English past and the present. Unlike the French, he 
wrote, the English never created a rift between the 
past and the present. For them, their past and their 
present were essentially the same. When seventeenth-
century Englishmen spoke of their “historic rights,” 
they were not speaking of a medieval relic that they 
wanted to hang on to. Rather, they had made their 
past move with themselves. While French liberty 
sprang from a revolt against history and tradition, 
“our liberty is based on “the historic rights of the 
Englishmen.””13 This idea of historic rights, forgotten 
under the Tudors, was effectively revived under the 
Stuarts. The agents of this revival, however, were not 
aristocrats with claims to a long continuous tradition 
behind them, but “middle class citizens interested in 
antiquarian research.”14
Thirteen years later, in his path-breaking 
work, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, 
J.G.A. Pocock built upon the work of his mentor. 
Acknowledging the influence of The Englishman 
and his History on his own work, he too set out 
to examine the nature of historical thought in 
England. Pocock’s seminal contribution, however, 
lay in emphasizing the intersection of common law 
and historical thought in the Early Modern period. 
In his view, during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centurie, studying law was the most important way 
of studying the past.15 But when they spoke of law, 
the English referred primarily to common law—the 
set of unwritten rules and customs that had regulated 
their conduct since time immemorial. While civil 
and canon law were systems borrowed from abroad, 
common law was native to England. In Pocock’s view, 
the grasp of common law on English thought was 
such that legal, constitutional, and national history 
was almost always interpreted within the frame of 
common law.16
Subsequent writings on common law, even if 
somewhat different in focus from Pocock’s, have 
largely remained within the parameters he laid out. 
Alan Cromartie’s work on Justice Matthew Hale, 
arguably the most prominent common lawyer of 
the 1640s and 1650s, and what Cromartie refers 
to as the “constitutionalist revolution”17 in English 
history, is a case in point. A remarkable omission 
from Pocock’s work was any substantive discussion 
of common law’s relationship with the religious 
turmoil of the time. This omission on Pocock’s part 
is understandable. Writing in 1957, he was obviously 
unaware of the central role that the ferocious 
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historiographical disputes of the 1970s and 1980s 
would accord religion in the legal and political issues 
of seventeenth-century England, and John Morrill’s 
contentious assertion that religion was the sole 
cause of the English Civil War was not available to 
Pocock.vi However, Cromartie’s work, despite being 
written in the 1990s, still presents the same problem. 
His biography of Hale is divided into three parts: 
law, religion, and, natural philosophy. However, in 
his introduction to the book, Cromartie confidently 
asserts that the sections on natural philosophy and 
religion can be read “quite independently” from the 
one on law.18 
In one of his shorter writings, Cromartie attacks 
several leading historians of the English Civil War, 
most notably John Morrill and Conrad Russell, 
arguing that due to their excessive focus on religion, 
they had failed to realize that common law too has to 
be taken in account when considering the origins and 
the course of the parliamentary rebellion. He believes 
that Conrad Russell’s argument that “…religious 
views were an excellent predictor of behavior during 
the wars” does not imply that everyone who spoke 
about these issues had theology in mind or that 
“religion was a sufficient cause of their allegiance.”19 
Cromartie’s argument presents a welcome revision.vii 
However, his zeal to assert its distinctiveness and 
novelty is misguided.   
While there is nothing wrong with Cromartie’s 
argument per se, he sells himself short by suggesting 
that common law too should be considered. Rather 
than simply arguing that common law is as relevant a 
theme as religion, it appears to be more fruitful to ask 
how common law and religion mixed with each other 
to define one’s worldview or the political stance that 
one took. Such an approach has the benefit of helping 
us to go beyond the parameters drawn by Pocock and 
taking a more expansive view of common law’s place 
in seventeenth-century politics. By using Sadler as a 
case study, my aim is to accomplish precisely this. 
This is not to suggest that religion has been 
completely ignored in studies of common law. In 
his recent book, The Constitutionalist Revolution, 
Cromartie argues that religion was central to 
common law’s dominance of English political life 
vi  Morrill famously argued that, rather than being the first of Europe’s 
modern revolutions, the English civil war was the last of its wars of religion. 
vii  With greater force and more comprehensive evidence, Janelle Greenberg 
has made the similar argument that the themes of common law and the 
ancient constitution were central to the parliamentary cause throughout the 
1640s. Greenberg, Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution. 
in the seventeenth century. The legalistic nature 
of the English Reformation, he argues, gave birth 
to the belief that, “English common law in a strict 
sense was omnicompetent, that is, was capable of 
finding answers to every social and political question 
including questions that concerned the powers of the 
church and the monarch.”20 For Cromartie, therefore, 
the relationship between common law and religion 
was a positive one in which religion enabled common 
law to acquire the dominant position that it did from 
the beginning of the seventeenth-century.  
 Reid Barbour’s biography of John Selden, one 
of the most influential polymaths of the seventeenth 
century, suggests that, on a smaller scale, Cromartie’s 
interpretation is rather simplistic.21 Focusing on 
the role of common law in Selden’s vision of the 
“holy commonwealth,” Barbour uncovers the highly 
ambiguous ties between common law and religious 
beliefs of the time. Born in 1584, Selden began to 
make his mark as a lawyer and legal scholar in the 
1620s. Like many of his contemporaries, he took 
great interest in establishing a comprehensive Holy 
Commonwealth. The idea was to envision a society 
in which “the social unity in question subsumes all of 
its practices, habits of thought, customs, institutions, 
and history under a predominantly shared sense of 
divine dispensation and warrants….”22 In most of his 
writings, Selden explored the role common law might 
play in establishing and regulating such a society.
Initially, according to Reid, Selden was 
convinced that, without common law, the holy 
commonwealth could not thrive. Selden’s studies, 
however, gradually led him to an ambiguous 
attitude towards the utility of common law for the 
establishment of the Holy Commonwealth. Selden’s 
1616 edition of the writings of Sir John Fortescue, 
Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in the fifteenth 
century, reveals a remarkable ambivalence towards 
common law. On one hand, Selden promoted 
Fortescue’s image as a legal sage, a Mosaic common 
lawyer. Yet, at the same time, he also critically refined 
this image. Gradually, Selden came to the conclusion 
that even if common law held power as a form of 
artificial reason, it would still have to “reckon with 
the imperfections of its own artifice.”23 Selden began 
to believe that England’s native laws, common law 
prominent amongst them, were not sufficient for 
the Holy Commonwealth. Rather, the laws of the 
Hebrews provided much more effective solutions 
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to the problems inherent in the establishment 
and running of the Commonwealth. To conclude, 
while Selden had begun with great confidence in 
common law as an agent of religious change, over the 
years, as he examined the common law tradition in 
greater depth, his confidence began to waver. What 
was earlier a firm belief gradually devolved into a 
proposition that Selden entertained only with great 
hesitation.
Barbour, of course, explores other aspects 
of Selden’s multifaceted life and scholarship. 
Nonetheless, his relatively short account of Selden’s 
writings on common law accomplishes two major 
goals. First, as has been discussed here, Barbour 
analyzes them in relation to Selden’s religious 
beliefs, thereby breaking away from the earlier 
historiography that kept common law and religion 
in isolation from each other. Second, in contrast to 
Cromartie, Barbour shows how common law and 
religion were not always allies. While Selden initially 
believed that common law was key to establishing 
the Holy Commonwealth, his faith in common law 
gradually weakened. Hence, in Selden’s case at least, 
the relationship between common law and religion 
was far from straightforward and positive.
In the subsequent section, I build upon 
Barbour’s approach to explore the connection 
between Sadler’s ideas about common law and 
his religious beliefs. In doing so, I first hope to 
join Cromartie and Barbour in examining the 
link between religion and common law to better 
understand common law’s position in seventeenth-
century political and intellectual culture. Second, by 
emphasizing that Sadler’s common law and religion 
were at odds, I wish to suggest that the relationship 
between religion and common law could be both 
positive and negative. 
III.  MILLENARIANISM AND COMMON LAW IN 
RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM (1649): 
Born in the town of Patcham, Sussex in 1615, 
John Sadler was educated at Emmanuel College, 
Cambridge.24 Widely considered to be the bastion of 
Puritan thought in the years before the outbreak of 
the English Civil War, Emmanuel brought him into 
contact with a number of theologians and clergymen, 
including his future brother-in-law John Harvard.25 
Though elected a fellow in 1639, Sadler left the 
scholarly corridors of Cambridge for London in 1640. 
Once in London, he quickly cultivated a network of 
influential patrons and made his way into important 
political circles. Under the patronage of army officer 
and religious writer Robert Greville, Sadler wrote 
Masquarade Du Ciel (1640), a short masque that 
he dedicated to Charles I’s French Catholic Queen 
Henrietta Maria. However, with the beginning of the 
Civil War, as politics became increasingly divided, he 
emerged as a prominent parliamentarian. 
In 1645, thanks to his increasingly robust 
political connections, Sadler, along with the writer 
Henry Parker, was appointed as secretary to the 
House of Commons.viii Apart from being an 
administrator, he also became an important part 
of the parliamentary propaganda machine. In June 
1645, when the parliamentary forces led by Sir 
Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell defeated the 
royalist forces and seized scandalous letters the 
King had sent to Queen Henrietta Maria, Sadler, 
along with Henry Parker and poet Thomas May, was 
chosen to edit the letters and later published them 
as The King’s Cabinet Opened (1645).ix To the editors 
and most of their readers, the letters stood as proof 
of the justness of the parliamentary cause. The letters 
showed the King to be an opportunist under the 
baleful influence of his Catholic queen. “The King,” 
argued the editors, “will declare nothing in favour 
of his parliament, so long as he can find a party to 
maintain him in this opposition; nor perform any 
thing which he hath declared so long as he can find a 
sufficient party to excuse him from it.”26 Publication 
of the letters had a devastating 
impact on the popular perception of Charles 
and did irreversible damage to the royalist cause.27
Similarly, in 1646, when an abortive royalist 
counter-revolution supported by the Presbyterians 
was at hand (the threat was so serious that the 
military had to mount a takeover to stop it), Sadler 
immediately responded with a short tract entitled 
A Word in Season.x The royalists, he argued, were 
viii  Ariel Hessayon, ‘Gold Tried in Fire’: The Prophet TheaurauJohn Tany and 
the English Revolution (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), 147. 
For Parker’s activities as a polemicist, see Michael J. Mendle, Henry Parker and 
the English Civil English Civil War: The Political Thought of the Public’s ‘Privado’ 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 2002). 
ix  For historiographical debates surrounding The King’s Cabinet Opened, 
see W.J. Bulman, “The Practice of Politics: The English Civil War and the 
Resolution of Henrietta Maria and Charles I”, Past and Present (2010) 206 (1): 
43-79. 
x  Austin Woolrych misrepresents Sadler’s argument when he writes that 
Sadler’s “main theme was that parliament’s authority was paramount and 
must not be impugned, even in the name of ‘the glory of God, the setting up 
of the Kingdome of JESUS CHRIST.’” When speaking of Christ’s kingdom, 
Sadler was referring to the false millennial promises of royalist prophets and 
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actively trying to deceive citizens who should also be 
cautious of the Presbyterians: “Wolves that come to 
us in sheepes clothing.”28 The royalists might make 
any number of promises, but the English people, he 
suggested, owed their freedom to the parliament:
Had it not been by this Just Authority 
[parliament], Wee had never been freed, from the 
tyrannies, oppressions and cruelties of the High 
Commission, Star-Chamber, and Councel-Board: 
from the burthenous Execution of Forrest Law, 
Court of Honor, Commissions of Waste: from 
the Extortions, and Exorbitances, in the Courtes 
of Justice, Chancery, Requests: from Shipmoney 
(for remission whereof, no lesse than twelve 
Subsidies were required) and from all those other 
innumerable Patents, Projects, Illegal Warrants 
and Imprisonments…29
By 1649, Sadler had established himself as 
a staunch defender of the Parliamentary cause. 
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that, once 
the King was executed, he jumped to the defense of 
the newly established Commonwealth with Rights of 
the Kingdom (Rights hereafter).xi Unlike Masqurade 
Du Ciel (1640) and Malignancy Unmasked, there 
is no evidence that a patron commissioned Sadler 
to produce Rights. However, upon publication, it 
attracted the attention of some of Sadler’s most 
prominent contemporaries; Milton and George 
Lawson, for example, cited him in their writings on 
the Commonwealth.30 In 1653, while on trial, soldier, 
printer, and republican thinker John Streater cited 
Sadler in his defense.xii Later in the century, John 
Locke recommended Sadler to readers who wanted 
to learn more about English legal history.xiii 
As Sadler’s most renowned work, Rights of the 
politicians. Thus, rather than subordinating millennial beliefs to respecting 
the Parliament’s authority, Sadler was simply warning his readers to be wary 
of Royalists who deluded them in the name of setting Christ’s kingdom on 
earth. See Woolrych, Commonwealth to Protectorate, 205. John Sadler, A Word 
in Season (London, 1646), 6-8. 
xi  Two separate editions of the tract survive. The first dates from 1649 when 
the tract was originally printed in either June or July (The two copies from 
1649 in the Thomason Tracts in the British Library carry two different dates 
of June 22, 1649 and July 10, 1649). The other edition is from 1682 when the 
tract was re-printed in wake of the Exclusion Crisis. Unless stated otherwise, 
all citations here come from the more legible 1682 edition. 
xii  “The Case of Captain JOHN STREATER, on an Habeas Corpus, at 
the Upper Bench in Westminster-hall, A.D. 1653” in William Cobbett, A 
Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other 
Crimes and Misdemeanors, Volume V (London, 1810), 378, 382. For Streater’s 
Republican thought and his work as a printer, see Adrian Johns, Nature of 
the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 266-324. 
xiii  For a brief analysis of Sadler’s influence on Locke, see Cromartie, The 
Constitutionalist Revolution, 276-278. 
Kingdom has often been featured in a longstanding 
debate in English historiography. Following J.G.A. 
Pocock, Glen Burgess has argued that writers such 
as Sadler, despite their seemingly radical orientation, 
still suggest that the notion of the “ancient 
constitution” was inherently conservative in nature.31 
Janelle Greenberg, in contrast, has argued that it is 
precisely writers like Sadler who represent what she 
calls the “radical face of the ancient constitution.”32 
The debate between Burgess and Greenberg, however, 
has a major shortcoming. At best, the debate seems 
irresolvable because both use rather arbitrary 
standards of what it means to be radical at the time, 
and neither provides a justification for why their 
usage of the label is valid. What makes Sadler a 
radical for Greenberg hardly counts as evidence for 
Sadler’s radicalism in Burgess’s view. Consequently, 
our understanding of Sadler has been bogged down 
in a debate where he does not serve the ends of either 
of the debaters.
This section moves away from this seemingly 
endless debate and explores the connection between 
Sadler’s understanding of common law and his 
religious views. Sadler, as I will show, believed 
common law mandated the House of Commons to 
be the supreme authority in England. His religious 
views, however, allowed him to impose limitations 
on what the House could do. Therefore, unlike John 
Selden, who furnished an example of how one’s 
religious beliefs (about the Holy Commonwealth) 
could be aligned with one’s ideas about common 
law, Sadler stands out as someone whose religious 
views came to oppose what his faith in common law 
entailed. 
In Rights, Sadler’s main aim, he explained, was to:
…see the Kingdoms Rights, the Laws and 
Customs of our Ancestors, concerning King 
and Parliament; that we may know their Power 
and Priviledge, their Duty and their Limits, &c. 
and how our Fathers did commit the power of 
making Laws, and judging by those Laws; and 
how they made us swear Allegiance to our King; 
what power they gave him over us; and what they 
did not give him over any of his subjects; and 
how we should behave ourselves.33
In doing so, he wanted to establish that 
executing the King and abolishing the House of Lords 
were perfectly legal and by no means extraordinary. 
Through an exhaustive examination of nearly 2000 
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years of “British, Saxon, Norman laws and histories,” 
he came to the conclusion that most kings in English 
history had come to power, not through royal 
succession but upon election by the Parliament and 
the people of England. Since the kings were elected, 
they were accountable to Parliament and the people. 
Consequently, if they failed to perform their duties, 
they could be punished.
Common law was central to this contention. 
In order to make his case, Sadler decided to see 
what “Antient Lawyers and Historians do record 
about our 26 Kings, their limitations by our Laws, 
their Title by Succession or Election at the common 
Law.”34 If Justice Henry de Bracton (c.1210-c.1268) 
and the medieval common Law treatise Fleta were 
to be asked about the nature of English kingship, 
wrote Sadler, they would unequivocally answer that, 
“in their times our King was Elective.”35 In some 
instances, Sadler conceded that the crown had indeed 
passed from a king to his biological successor. These, 
however, were situations where no other person in 
the entire kingdom was as capable as the biological 
successor to the throne. Regardless of the exceptions, 
the general trend in English history had been one of 
election rather than succession.
Despite the immense variety of Sadler’s sources, 
his analysis, as Janelle Greenberg has pointed 
out, rests mostly on three main sources: the Leges 
Edwardis Confessoris (Laws of Edward the Confessor, 
written c. 1140),xiv lawyer Andrew Horn’s The 
Mirrors of Justices (early fourteenth century), and 
Modus Tenendi Parliamentum, or Method of Holding 
Parliament (author unknown).xv All three sources 
were central to common law in the seventeenth 
century and Sadler, an eminent common lawyer 
himself, drew heavily upon them to illustrate the 
nature of English kingship and role of the Parliament. 
The Mirrors, wrote Sadler, is clear that his Saxon 
ancestors always elected their kings and bound them 
by “Oaths and Laws.”36 Similarly, Laws of Edward 
the Confessor mentioned that the king was always 
elected by a council of the Kingdom. Never in 
English history had the Crown ever passed from one 
monarch to another through “blind succession.” For 
xiv  The laws were not written or issued by King Edward the Confessor (1042-
1066) but were composed anonymously. This explains why they appeared 
almost eighty years after his death. 
xv  According to Thomas Duffus Hardy, senior assistant keeper of the Public 
Record Office and editor of the Modus in the Nineteenth century, the work 
was authored at some point between 1294 and 1327. Thomas Duffus Hardy, 
Modus Tenendi Parliamentum: An Ancient Treatise on the Mode of Holding the 
Parlimanent in England (London: G.E. Eyre and W. Spottiswoode, 1846), xvii. 
Sadler’s purposes, it was also important to illustrate 
that the people had always been represented in 
parliament, which had consistently played a central 
role in governance. Here too, he turned to these three 
sources. “The track of parliaments,” he wrote, “is 
visible enough, in all the Saxons reigning here.” 37As 
the Mirrors clearly illustrated, parliaments were so 
central to governing the Kingdom that King Alfred 
(ninth century) decided to hold them at least twice a 
year.
Parliament, however, was more than just an 
important accessory to the monarch. In Sadler’s 
view, without the parliament, the king was a mere 
figurehead. Sadler drew on Mirrors for this argument. 
In order to make this point, Sadler turned his reader’s 
attention to the popular maxim, “The King can do no 
wrong.” He argued the maxim made sense only if we 
recognized that the king “can do nothing but by Law; 
and what he may by Law, can do no wrong.”38 The 
king, therefore, was bound to act within the confines 
of the law. Only then did it make sense to argue that 
he can do no wrong. However, if he went against 
the Law, his actions were meaningless because, on 
his own, as the Mirrors explained, the king’s rights 
and dignities were akin to those of a child: “If he 
do against the Law, his Personal Acts, Commands 
or Writing do oblige no more than they were a 
Childs.”39 The implication was that, independently, 
the king could pass as many as laws as he wanted. 
However, since in legal terms he was nothing but 
an infant, it was only the consent or approval of the 
Parliament that gave the laws meaning and force.
By Parliament, however, Sadler only meant 
the House of Commons. The House of Lords, he 
argued, was rather superfluous, implying that the 
recent abolition of the House of Lords was not an 
extraordinary measure. Rather than making laws, 
members of the House of Lords acted simply as 
“Judges and the Kings Counsellors.” This was evident 
in the Old “Writs of Summons,” which explained 
that nothing could be done without the Commons.40 
To elaborate upon this, Sadler made a distinction 
between Barons by tenure and Barons by patent or 
writ. Barons by tenure were those who wielded a 
great amount of power before the Barons’ War in 
the thirteenth century. The new Barons or Barons by 
Patent or Writ, while they might have had legislative 
rights, had been created by the Monarch to serve 
solely in a judicial capacity. Therefore, it was unfair 
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to argue that present day Lords who had descended 
from the Barons by patent or writ wielded the same 
authority as the “old Barons by Tenure.”41
For further proof, Sadler again turned to the 
Laws of Edward the Confessor, the Mirrors, and 
Modus. Laws of Edward the Confessor, he noted, 
obligated the king to pass the just laws made by the 
House of Commons. The House of Lords had no 
significant role in the process. Similarly, the Mirrors, 
he argued, mentioned that the House of Commons 
was older than the House of Lords. The latter had 
emerged from the former but carried no legislative 
authority, only judicial. The Modus, in his opinion, 
presented a remarkably similar view and suggested 
that, while there was a time when the Parliament had 
no House of Lords, it was impossible to imagine a 
time when there was no House of Commons. Older 
and more authoritative than the Lords, the House of 
Commons was the preeminent legislative authority in 
England. No one, including the king, was above it.42
In order to better illustrate that the Parliament 
was the supreme legislative authority, Sadler turned 
to the militia. In doing so, he moved from the 
rather obscure realm of legal antiquarianism and 
touched upon an issue with strong contemporary 
resonance. The problem of whether the king could 
muster a militia without the Parliament’s consent 
had led to the rapid escalation of hostilities in 1642. 
By June 1642, it had become clear to Charles that 
the Parliamentarians were neither going to retract 
any of their demands nor settle for a compromise. 
Therefore, in case hostilities broke out, it would be 
best to have the provinces on his side. To this end, 
Charles decided to use the Commission of Array, a 
royal instrument that had not been used since 1557. 
Signed by the king and impressed with the Great 
Seal, one Commission of Array was drawn for each 
county and major city.43 Each document contained 
a list of individuals whom the king expected to take 
up arms in his defense. These men, known as the 
Commissioners of Array, were required to summon 
the local militia and persuade them to support the 
king. They were also responsible for collecting men 
and money and sending them to join the armies the 
king had begun to raise.44
Parliament, of course, had been a step ahead 
of Charles. In March 1642, it had already passed the 
militia ordinance in order to muster up forces from 
all parts of the country. Unsurprisingly, there was 
little legal trouble. Unlike statutes, ordinances did 
not require the King’s assent and were meant to be 
temporary.45 However, when Charles took a similar 
step, the Parliament reacted furiously. Declaring that 
Charles’s orders were illegal, as he had failed to secure 
parliamentary consent, it sought to counter his 
propaganda with equally strong measures. According 
to a note dated July 4, 1642, in the Journal of the 
House of Commons, 9,000 copies of the Declaration 
against the Commissions of Array were printed and 
distributed widely.46 
A committed parliamentarian, Sadler had 
been clearly vexed by the problem of who could 
and could not raise a militia. He conceded that 
men ought to have arms to defend the king and the 
kingdom. However, he felt that the evidence used 
to make a claim for the Commission of Array stood 
more against than for it. Referring to a passage from 
the Laws of Edward the Confessor that had often 
been cited in support of the Commission of Array, 
Sadler noted that the end of the passage did speak 
of the command of the king. However, the arms in 
question had to be assessed by common consent.47 
More importantly, the requirements should always be 
proportional to a man’s estate, “Free for the Defence 
of the Kingdom; and for the Service due to the 
Lords.” According to various sources of common law, 
this should be and always had been the case.
Going beyond the authority of Laws of Edward 
the Confessor, Sadler referred to a number of other 
texts and examples of monarchs who raised militia 
but only with consent of the Parliament. The Writings 
of William I, he argued, followed the same line as 
that of Laws of Edward the Confessor and proved 
the presence of “Common Council in his time,” 
which sanctioned the raising of a militia.48 Similarly, 
“These Laws of King William, with the Additions 
and Emendations of the Confessor’s, were afterwards 
confirmed by King Henry the 1st. as appeareth by 
his Charter.”49 Other monarchs, noted Sadler, had 
practiced what they preached. While it was true 
that Henry IV issued a Commission of Array, “it 
was again declared as the undoubted Right of this 
Kingdom, not to be charged with ought, for Defence 
of the Realm, or Safeguard of the Seas, but by their 
own Will and Consent in Parliament.”50 The keyword 
here is “own Will” because it bears Sadler’s other 
contention that Parliament’s consent alone was 
insufficient. The people themselves had to give their 
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consent.xvi In his view:
There is no such boundless Authority, given to 
two or three Strangers, (or others,) to compel all 
Men but themselves, to provide and bear Arms, 
how, and when, and where it shall seem good to 
such commissioners: Which at one seemeth to 
Dissolve all Laws of Liberty.51
Related to this is Sadler’s discussion of 
tenures. Supporters of the Commission of Array 
had suggested that the “Tenures of Crown” bound 
subjects to the defence of the kingdom. Common law, 
according to Sadler, presented a more complicated 
picture. Referring to lawyer Andrew Horn’s Mirrors 
of Justices, Sadler argued that even if the Mirrors 
suggested that “Tenures of the Crown were appointed 
for the Defence of the Kingdom,” this tenure had 
to be assessed by the aforementioned “Common 
Consent,” comprising both the Parliament and 
the people.52 Another source that Sadler drew his 
reader’s attention to was Sir Thomas Littleton’s 
treatise on tenures known as Littleton. Written 
sometime in the fifteenth century, Littleton proved 
to be enormously influential during the Early 
Modern period.53 None other than Justice Edward 
Coke published a well-known commentary on it.xvii 
William Fulbecke, a playwright and legal scholar, 
captured the work’s influence aptly when he wrote 
that, “Littleton is not now the name of a lawyer, but 
of the law itself.”54 Divided into three parts, Littleton 
deals with the system of estates in land, title, and 
tenures. Sadler analyzed the second part, which 
xvi  It is clear from the text that Sadler opposed the Commissions of Array. 
However, whether he took the rather unlikely position that defending the 
realm was entirely voluntary is hard to tell. 
xvii Historiography on the Hartlib Circle is rich and varied. The most 
comprehensive work is Webster Charles, The Great Instauration: Science, 
Medicine and Reform, 1626-1660 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975). 
For more specific aspects of the Circle, see Samuel Hartlib and Universal 
Reformation: Studies in Intellectual Communication ed. by Mark Greengrass, 
Michael Leslie and Timothy Raylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), Yamamoto, Koji. “Reformation and the Distrust of the Projector 
in the Hartlib Circle.” The Historical Journal 55, no. 2 (2012): 375-397. For 
biographies of prominent Hartlibians, see Thomas Leng, Benjamin Worsley 
(1618-1677): Trade, Interest and The Spirit in Revolutionary England (Boydell 
& Brewer, 2008) and Ted McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of 
Political Arithmetic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Some 
historians, however, have been skeptical of the claim that all members 
of the Hartlib Circle were ardent millenarians. Malcolm Oster’s essay on 
Robert Boyle is a case in point. Oster questions the prominence James Jacob 
assigned to Boyle’s millenarianism and contends that Boyle’s relationship with 
millenarianism remains ambiguous at best. One of the defining characteristics 
of millenarianism, notes Oster, is a “specific expectation adopted in predicting 
a particular configuration of literal political transformations of the earth.” At 
times, Boyle’s writings exhibit a “distinct reluctance to follow that disposition”. 
See Malcolm Oster, “Millenarianism and the New Science: The Case of Robert 
Boyle” in Samuel Hartlib and Universal Reformation ed. by Greengrass, Leslie 
and Raylor, 137-148.
focused on tenures. According to Sadler, anyone who 
had read Littleton could not fail to see that tenure, 
according to the “common law and Custom of the 
King,” was to be assessed not by the King but by 
“Common Assent in Parliament.”55 Therefore, even if 
it was true that tenure bound subjects to their King’s 
defense, they could not legitimately be forced to 
take up arms against their own will and without the 
consent of the Parliament. The ultimate control of the 
militia, consequently, rested with the people and the 
Parliament. 
Based on only common law, it would seem 
that any action the Parliamentarians took against 
the King was justified. However, this is not the 
position Sadler takes in Rights. On the contrary, the 
work also illustrates how Sadler’s religious beliefs 
conflicted with the lessons of common law. The focal 
point is Sadler’s discussion of how his millenarian 
beliefs obligate him to criticize Pride’s Purge, the 
stepping stone towards the execution of the King 
and establishment of the Commonwealth. It is at 
this point that the opposition between common law 
and religion becomes sharp and clear. If Sadler’s 
interpretation of common law led him to the 
conclusion that the recent abolition of the monarchy 
was not anomalous, his religious views created 
serious doubts about the means through which 
the abolition had been achieved.  
 Though focused primarily on “Rights of the 
Kingdom” and the “Customs of our Ancestors,”as 
indicated in the full title, Rights was also meant to 
be, “An Occasional Discourse of great changes yet 
expected in the world.” The “great changes” refer 
to the then-prevalent belief in the Second Coming 
of Christ mentioned in the Book of Revelation. 
This belief can best be described with the label 
of millenarianism. To borrow Norman Cohn’s 
description, millenarianism, a variant of Christian 
eschatology, denotes the belief that after his Second 
Coming, Christ would establish a messianic kingdom 
on earth and would reign over it for a thousand years 
before the Last Judgment.56
There is no doubt that, even before he wrote 
Rights, Sadler was an ardent millenarian. He was 
a very active member of the Hartlib Circle, the 
renowned group of millenarian thinkers oriented 
around the Polish émigré Samuel Hartlib.xviii Sadler 
xviii  Historiography on the Hartlib Circle is rich and varied. The most 
comprehensive work is Webster Charles, The Great Instauration: Science, 
Medicine and Reform, 1626-1660 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975). 
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used his political contacts to help Hartlib with his 
“Office of Address” and established connections 
with prominent thinker and Robert Boyle’s sister 
Katherine Jones, Viscountess Ranelagh. In his 
letters to Hartlib, he often expressed his millenarian 
aspirations. In an undated letter to Hartlib, Sadler 
told him: “If I deceive not myself, I dayly (sic) grow 
in hopes, & some assurance, that God is coming 
to dwell in the World to bind up the Devil, with 
our lusts & passions…For the whole Earth might 
be full of his Glory: & all his workers shall praise 
him; yea every Tree shall rejoyce.”57 With the socio-
political upheavals that preceded and accompanied 
the publication of Rights, Sadler’s confidence in his 
millenarian beliefs seems to have gained greater 
strength. He wrote:
I hope and believe, or know that God will come, 
and appear, ere long, to dwell in the World: 
For, the Earth shall be full of his Glory, and 
his Kingdom shall come, and his Will be done, 
on Earth, as now in Heaven, So, we were taught to 
ask; and it therefore shall be fully answered.58
However, unlike many other millenarians, 
particularly the Fifth Monarchists, Sadler did not 
see revolutionary violence as the way to hasten the 
coming of the Millennium.xix In an uprising led by 
the Fifth Monarchists in 1661, over forty people 
were killed in street fighting and numerous others 
wounded.59 Sadler, in contrast, believed that he 
did not know what force would pull Babylon down 
but the one that builds the new Temple or the new 
Jerusalem certainly would not be built by violence 
or violent men: “…they may perish by the Sword 
For more specific aspects of the Circle, see Samuel Hartlib and Universal 
Reformation: Studies in Intellectual Communication ed. by Mark Greengrass, 
Michael Leslie and Timothy Raylor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), Yamamoto, Koji. “Reformation and the Distrust of the Projector 
in the Hartlib Circle.” The Historical Journal 55, no. 2 (2012): 375-397. For 
biographies of prominent Hartlibians, see Thomas Leng, Benjamin Worsley 
(1618-1677): Trade, Interest and The Spirit in Revolutionary England (Boydell 
& Brewer, 2008) and Ted McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions 
of Political Arithmetic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Some 
historians, however, have been skeptical of the claim that all members 
of the Hartlib Circle were ardent millenarians. Malcolm Oster’s essay on 
Robert Boyle is a case in point. Oster questions the prominence James Jacob 
assigned to Boyle’s millenarianism and contends that Boyle’s relationship with 
millenarianism remains ambiguous at best. One of the defining characteristics 
of millenarianism, notes Oster, is a “specific expectation adopted in predicting 
a particular configuration of literal political transformations of the earth.” At 
times, Boyle’s writings exhibit a “distinct reluctance to follow that disposition”. 
See Malcolm Oster, “Millenarianism and the New Science: The Case of Robert 
Boyle” in Samuel Hartlib and Universal Reformation ed. by Greengrass, Leslie 
and Raylor, 137-148. 
xix  The standard work on the Fifth Monarchists is Bernard Capp, The Fifth 
Monarchy Men: A Study in Seventeenth Century English Millenarianism 
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1972). 
that use it most”.60 The way to the millennium had 
to be one of peace, justice, and kindness. He prayed 
that “all may be both Just, and Justly done. Not with 
Justice only, but with Pitty and great compassion, and 
much Mercy, for in many things we fail all.”61
It was this pacifism that led Sadler to his 
scathing critique of the House of Commons. The 
cause of his distress was the infamous Pride’s Purge. 
Referring to the Purge, Sadler argued that the House 
of Commons had failed the Commonwealth. “To 
speak freely”, he wrote, “although I will not Judg the 
Commons, yet I cannot justifie that House”.62 On 
December 6, 1648, when Parliament’s normal guards 
came to Westminster, about a thousand men of the 
New Model Army blocked their way in Whitehall. 
By eight o’clock that morning, the soldiers had taken 
their positions in Palace Yard, Westminster Hall, the 
Court of Requests and on the stairs and lobby outside 
the House of Commons. It soon became clear to the 
M.P.s (Members of the Parliament) that something 
was amiss.63 Soon, Colonel Thomas Pride of the New 
Model Army came with a list of M.P.s who had been 
attempting to reach a compromise with the King and 
were opposed to trying and punishing him. Holding 
his hat in his band, Pride entered the House and 
saluted the M.P.s. Seconds later, he told them that he 
had orders to arrest them.
Most of the members acquiesced to the arrest 
and gave themselves over to Pride’s officers. Others, 
however, either skipped out or got word of the 
situation before arriving. This was soon rectified. 
Colonel John Birch, M.P. for Leominster, and Edward 
Stephens, M.P. for Teweksbury and Gloucestershire, 
were “pulled out…as they looked out at the door.” 
Birch called out to the other M.P.s for help but was 
ignored.64 Similarly, lawyer and polemicist William 
Prynne was directly confronted by Pride himself 
but refused to submit. As he tried to move away, 
Pride, Sir Hardress Waller, and some other soldiers 
overpowered him and dragged him to the Court 
of Requests. Prynne continued to protest but was 
taken to join other arrested members, who were now 
under guard in the Queen’s Court.65 By removing the 
members who were still seeking a way to compromise 
with the King, the Purge effectively created the way 
for the King’s execution and abolition of the House of 
Lords.
Even if Sadler did not know any of these 
particular details, he found himself outraged by this 
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show of force by the New Model Army. Speaking 
of the House of Commons, he wrote, “I must also 
condemn what was lately done to them also…by 
that army which hath often been acknowledged, 
to have both served and saved them from Ruine or 
Slavery.”66 Sadler acknowledged that his thoughts 
on the events were somewhat hazy, and he found 
it difficult to make up his mind. The distinction 
between “free” and “force,” he said, was very thin. 
What he considered to be force might mean freedom 
to someone else. Similarly, he was in no position to 
judge what counted as an act of treason or felony as 
there were situations when force might be deployed 
to avoid disaster. He said, “For it may be possible 
(but I hope not probable) that some Parliament-men 
may design or consent to such a dangerous Treason 
or Felony, that it may be the Duty of Officers or 
others to detain or secure them, till the Cause be 
heard in Parliament.”67 Nonetheless, Sadler felt it was 
very clear that, even though the “Law and Custom 
of Parliament” said that, “40 may be an House of 
Commons as well as 400,” he wondered to “see 40 sit 
alone, about the greatest Matters possible, without 
so much as calling the rest, or sending Writs for new 
Elections.”68 Similarly, if the King could not absent 
himself without the Parliament’s consent, the M.P.’s 
too had no right to do so. According to the old “Writ 
of Election,” M.P.’s could not depart from Parliament 
without Consent of the Parliament.69
Like many of his contemporaries, Sadler saw 
God’s hand as guiding the events around him. He 
too interpreted the sociopolitical changes around 
him as another step towards the fulfillment of his 
millenarian beliefs and aspirations. However, as 
mentioned earlier, force and violence did not fit into 
Sadler’s worldview. When the Parliament that he had 
spent the entire Civil War supporting turned to such 
a show of force and violence, Sadler felt obligated 
to criticize it. Yet, in doing so, he ended up taking 
the rather unusual position that the ends but not 
the means of the Commonwealth were justified.xx 
It is not clear whether Sadler was aware of the 
apparent inconsistency of his position. Similarly, he 
never explicitly recognized the tension between his 
religious views and his interpretation of common law. 
Regardless of his recognition, the two were still at 
xx  As far as I know, no other thinker took this position. John Milton and 
Marchamont Nedham, two of the most articulate and influential defenders 
of the commonwealth do not seem to have criticized Pride’s Purge. Blair 
Worden, Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England: John Milton, Andrew 
Marvell, Marchamont Nedham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 218. 
odds. 
Throughout the 1640s and the 1650s, Sadler 
was a committed parliamentarian. During the Civil 
War, he staunchly defended the Parliament against 
repeated attacks of the royalists and those who 
doubted the efficacy of the Parliament. When the 
King was executed, Sadler quickly jumped to the 
defense of the newly established Commonwealth. In 
asserting the supremacy of the House of Commons 
over the monarchy and the House of Lords, he 
put his knowledge of common law to use and 
fervently argued that common law justified the new 
Commonwealth. However, when the House resorted 
to force, Sadler’s religious views overrode his belief 
in the supremacy of the House of Commons. If 
his faith in common law had allowed him to speak 
for the authority of the Parliament, his religious 
views allowed him to impose limitations on the 
very authority that common law helped establish. 
Consequently, Sadler’s religious views and his faith in 
common law clashed with each other. 
IV.  REASON: ARISTOTELIAN AND PLATONIC
In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, 
common lawyers often emphasized reason and 
custom as the keys to the supremacy of common 
law; both of these lent it an unmatched distinction. 
However, as J.G.A. Pocock discovered in his seminal 
study, appealing to both reason and custom presented 
a peculiar paradox. If law is custom, it follows that 
law changes constantly and adapts to the changing 
circumstances, but if it is reason, it is immutable.70 
How, asked Pocock, can law be both changing and 
immutable at the same time? In The Politics of the 
Ancient Constitution (1993), Glen Burgess argued 
that, despite identifying the problem, Pocock failed 
to resolve it. Burgess wrote that Pocock focused 
mainly on custom and failed to adequately consider 
reason. In fact, upon a closer examination, Pocock’s 
paradox turns out to be an illusion.71 In Burgess’s 
view, common lawyers did not treat custom and 
reason as necessarily antithetical. Taking reason to 
be more important than custom, they believed that it 
was the customary nature of common law that made 
it reasonable.72
The debate, however, does not end here. A 
number of historians have been vexed with the 
related problem of how common lawyers defined 
reason. In his biography of Sir Matthew Hale (1609-
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1676), the leading legal authority of the Interregnum, 
Alan Cromartie tried his hand at the problem 
through a study of Sir Edward Coke. Coke’s belief 
that law acquired its authority through reason was 
hardly novel.73 However, what distinguished Coke 
from others who had made the same point (such 
as Circeo) was his conception of “artificial reason.” 
Unlike the layman’s “natural reason,” artificial reason 
was the skill and specialized knowledge acquired 
by the common lawyer through diligent study of 
Year Books and Reports produced by other lawyers 
for over three centuries.74 No one is born with this 
form of reason; rather, one develops it only through 
education and practice.
In The Common Law Mind (2000), J.W. Tubbs 
suggested that this understanding of Coke’s “artificial 
reason” is questionable. Citing the varied scholarly 
interpretations of the concept, he contended that 
Coke’s writings appear to support all of the varied 
readings.75 Nonetheless, sweeping his initial doubts 
aside, he presents an interpretation similar to 
Cromartie’s. Regardless of a person’s natural gifts, 
he writes, artificial reason can be developed only 
through education, training, and experience.76 
However, Tubbs departs from Cromartie and others 
in two ways. First, he attempts to ground this 
understanding of reason in the wider intellectual 
context of the time. Second, he compares Coke with 
other common lawyers, most notably Sir Henry 
Finch (c.1558-1625) and Sir John Doddridge (1555-
1628). The notion of artificial reason, according 
to Tubbs, is a standard product of the Aristotelian 
learning of the time. With its emphasis on the art of 
argument and derivation of further conclusions from 
first principles, Aristotelianism laid the foundation 
for a notion of reason that stood for specialized 
knowledge derived through the study of particular 
cases.77 In his discussion of Finch and Dodderidge, 
Tubbs points to a number of ways in which they 
differed from Coke. Nonetheless, like Coke, they 
too were under the influence of the prevailing 
Aristotelianism of the time. Therefore, Tubbs 
concludes, seventeenth-century common lawyers 
thought of reason primarily in Aristotelian terms.78
Not all historians, however, have argued for 
the prominence of Aristotelianism as sweepingly 
as Tubbs. Stephen A. Siegel has suggested that the 
Aristotelian foundations of reason as it related to 
common law increasingly came under attack over 
the course of the seventeenth-century.79 Siegel 
locates the source of this attack in what historians 
now refer to as the “Scientific Revolution” that swept 
through Europe during the period. The “Scientific 
Revolution”, he writes, gave birth to the “analytical-
synthetical method,” which diverged from the 
existing Aristotelian method in a very important 
way. While Aristotle’s teleology had led him to create 
a distinction between form and matter, several 
seventeenth-century thinkers did not oppose matter 
and form. Consequently, since matter and form 
were essentially the same, they could be understood 
equally well.xxi This led to a demand for certainty 
and truth that, as Hobbes argued, common law and 
its dependence on Coke’s “artificial reason” failed to 
meet. While Hobbes’s attack was against the notion 
of common law itself, for our current purposes, it 
is sufficient to highlight his critique of the idea of 
“artificial reason.” In Hobbes’s view, “artificial reason” 
acquired through diligent study and experience 
led not to knowledge but opinions that are, at best, 
probable truth. Consequently, the notion of “artificial 
reason” was severely inadequate for dealing with the 
crucial matters of justice and administration.80
Unlike Siegel who focused on the “Scientific 
Revolution,” this section looks at Platonism as a 
force in seventeenth-century thought. Pointing to 
Sadler as a notable exception, it argues that Sadler’s 
understanding of reason was primarily Platonic, not 
Aristotelian. Emerging from a tradition that sought 
to break away from the Aristotelian scholasticism 
formally dominant in English universities, Sadler’s 
understanding of reason was fundamentally different 
from that of Coke and others. To this end, this 
section begins with an account of the emergence 
of Platonism as a strand of thought in seventeenth-
century England. In particular, it highlights Sadler’s 
association with the Cambridge Platonists, a group of 
thinkers based at the University of Cambridge.  
 Until the seventeenth century, scholasticism, 
based on the corpus of Aristotle’s writings, was the 
dominant mode of thought in European universities. 
xxi  Ibid.,47. Admittedly, Siegel’s interpretation of the “Scientific Revolution” 
is a bit dated. It is hard to imagine that any historian of science today would 
accept it. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily diminish the value of his 
article as perhaps the only attempt to examine the changes common law 
underwent in response to the intellectual transformations of the seventeenth-
century. For more recent interpretations of the “Scientific Revolution,” see H. 
Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), and Lawrence Lipking, What 
Galileo Saw: Imagining the Scientific Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2014). 
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Not so much a system of theology or philosophy as 
a method of teaching, it followed the Aristotelian 
emphasis on establishing the first principles that 
articulated the fundamental nature of something, 
principles which were to be used later to derive 
further results via inference. Central to this method 
was the idea of formal disputation that involved 
a constant exchange of arguments between a 
teacher and his students and amongst the students 
themselves. Beginning in the 1630s and 1640s, a 
number of Cambridge scholars found themselves 
increasingly dissatisfied with scholasticism, despite 
the common current at the university. To many 
contemporaries, the method seemed wasteful and 
extremely unsatisfactory. In 1632, John Milton, 
then a student at Christ’s College, complained that 
Aristotelian thought was outmoded and insufficient 
in meeting the intellectual challenges of the day.81 
Less a method for the pursuit of truth, the constant 
bickering appeared more to be a way of satisfying 
egos and settling scores. In his Academiarum Examen 
(1656), cleric and physician John Webster denounced 
the method as a:
…a civil war of words, a verbal contest, a combat 
of cunning, craftiness, violence and altercation, 
wherein all verbal force, by impudence, 
insolence, opposition, contradiction, derision, 
diversion, trifling, jeering, humming, hissing, 
brawling, quarreling, scolding, scandalizing, and 
the like, are equally allowed of, and accounted 
just, and no regard had to the truth….82
Even more vexing was scholasticism’s close 
alignment with the reigning theology of Calvinism 
and, at times, doctrinaire Catholicism. With its rigid 
academic formulations, scholasticism proved to be 
a nurturing ground for the doctrines of Calvinism, 
which emphasized predestination and did not 
value human reason or freedom of the will.83 As a 
student at Eton, the philosopher Henry More felt 
that this made God inscrutable and contradicted his 
personal belief in the inherent goodness of God.84 
Therefore, towards the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, there emerged increasing dissatisfaction 
with scholasticism and its Aristotelian foundations. 
When More and some of his contemporaries went to 
Cambridge, they fervently sought an alternative.
Aristotle’s own teacher Plato, as well as his 
later interpreters, including Plotinus, furnished a 
potential alternative to the inadequacies of Aristotle 
and scholasticism. Their writings proved to be 
instrumental in articulating a worldview markedly 
different from Calvinism. According to Mark Goldie, 
the starting point was Plato’s doctrine of soul, 
reason, and knowledge. On Earth, the soul exists in 
a state of alienation from the universal divine mind. 
Its sole purpose is the pursuit of knowledge and 
contemplation of the divine. However, this is possible 
only through the exercise of reason.85 But reason, 
unlike what the scholastics took it to be, went beyond 
the ability to form conclusions through deduction 
and inference. It was, as Platonic writers defined it, 
“the organ of divine sense.”86 Within themselves, 
humans carried “an intuition of archetypal truths that 
subsist in the divine mind.”87 Through this intuition, 
humans could choose between the good and the evil 
and embrace the divine. This understanding diverged 
from Calvinism in two ways. First, in contrast with 
the Calvinist disregard for reason presumably in 
favor of grace, the Platonic understanding affirmed 
reason’s centrality to the contemplation of the divine. 
Second, through its emphasis on man’s ability to 
choose between good and evil through his innate 
sense, it did away with the Calvinistic belief that 
it was only through God that man could do good 
and achieve salvation. Embracing Plato’s writings, 
therefore, provided a distinctively new understanding 
of the meaning and power of human reason and 
man’s relation to God.
These ideas were best articulated in the middle 
decades of the seventeenth century by the Cambridge 
Platonists. xxii The term “Cambridge Platonism,” 
however, was first used in the nineteenth-century. 
When speaking of the seventeenth-century, the 
group cannot always be distinguished from the 
wider movement of latitudinarianism, which called 
for the rejection of “narrowness and sectarian 
xxii  Literature on the Cambridge Platonists is vast. See C.A. Patrides, The 
Cambridge Platonists (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1969), Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance 
in England, translated by J.P. 
Pettegrove (1953), Sarah Hutton, “The Cambridge Platonists”, in S. Nadler 
(ed.), Blackwell Companion to Early 
Modern Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). For studies of individual 
Platonists, see Benjamin Carter, ‘The Little 
Commonwealth of Man’: The Trinitarian Origins of the Ethical and Political 
Philosophy of Ralph Cudworth 
(Louvain: Peeters, 2011), Sarah Hutton, Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), Jasper Reid, The Metaphysics of Henry More (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2012) and 
David Leech, The Hammer of the Cartesians: Henry More’s Philosophy of Spirit 
and the Origins of Modern Atheism (Louvain: Peeters, 2013).
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partisanship in religion.”88 Nonetheless, it is possible 
to identify the core members of the group. These 
were Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, both fellows 
of Christ’s College, and Benjamin Whichcote, John 
Worthington, Peter Sterry, John Smith, and Nathaniel 
Culverwell, all fellows of Emmanuel College. 
Therefore, rather than being a university-wide group, 
Cambridge Platonism was limited to Christ’s and 
Emmanuel. 
Born in 1615, Sadler attended Emmanuel 
College in 1630. He earned his BA in 1634, his MA 
in 1638 and went on to become a fellow in 1639. 
Though there is no direct evidence, it is likely that 
Sadler came into contact with Whichcote and others 
during his time at Emmanuel, and several studies 
of the period mention him as one of the Cambridge 
Platonists.89 Yet, as Sarah Hutton has pointed out, 
Sadler’s relationship to the group has never been 
explored.90 That aside, we are yet to ascertain if he 
was a Platonist at all. My aim here is to fill the gap 
identified by Hutton. Through a close reading of 
Sadler’s masque Masquerade Du Ciel (1640), I hope 
to firmly establish that Platonism was a significant 
strand in his thought and came to shape his 
understanding of reason.91 
In using Sadler’s masque as my case study, I 
do not wish to imply that the piece is exceptional by 
all standards. In fact, it is reasonable to suggest that 
most masques written by university students such 
as Sadler were neo-platonic.xxiii My point, as I will 
show, is that Sadler’s masque is particularly valuable 
in thinking about common lawyers conceptualized 
reason and its relation to common law.  
 Dedicated to Queen Henrietta Maria, the 
French Catholic Queen of King Charles I, the masque 
presents an allegory for royal supremacy, and the 
just and benign nature of Kingship. Set in “the Little 
World or the Isle of Britain, ”it tells the story of how 
the “late commotions” between Saturn and Mercury 
are settled by the “goodnesse” of monarchs Phebus 
and Phebe. The plot, writes Sadler, is divided into 
two parts: “celestiall” and “terrestriall”. The “celestiall” 
aims at providing the “most true and exact draught of 
the Site and Motions of the SUN, MOONE, VENUS, 
MERCURY, JUPITER and MARS; with other 
heavenly bodies, through the yeeres, 1639, 1640, &c 
(sic).” The “terrestriall”, on the other hand, represents 
how these motions were “shadowed upon earth”.92  
xxiii  I thank Professor Adrian Johns for this point. 
 The quarrel between Saturn and Mercury 
begins with Phebus sending Mercury to the Northern 
Thule.xxiv However, Saturn, already present in the 
region, drives Mercury back. Enraged, Phebus, 
accompanied by Jupiter, Mars, and their Satellites, 
initially approaches Saturn in a “Warre-like Manner”. 
However, Phebe, with her “Royall Goodnesse”, 
intervenes asking Phebus to mediate peace which 
Phebus grants immediately. A discontented Mars 
tries to disturb the peace and “by divers assayes, 
Labours to break it.”93 Phebus strikes and holds 
Mars prisoner. However, once Phebus returns to his 
Southern residence, Venus petitions him on behalf of 
Mars. Good and gracious, Phebus grants her request. 
Undeterred by his imprisonment, Mars still plots to 
incense Saturn and Mercury. He succeeds and, once 
again, Saturn drives Mercury out of Thule. Judging 
the gravity of the matter, Phebe and Phebus now 
summon the “Grand Councell of all the Seeming 
Deities.” Charged with rebellion against Phebus, Mars 
is now forced to “forfeit all His Honours, Dignities, 
Priviledges &c. to His Soveraigne PHEBUS.” Next, 
somewhat unexpectedly, Saturn and Mercury 
voluntarily “resigne up all Their Possessions, Claimes, 
&c. into PHEBUS Hands, acknowledging Their 
dependence on His Royall favour.” Yet Phebus, once 
again moved by his “wonted Goodnesse” reinvests 
them with their former privileges and several new 
ones knowing that “Royal Goodnesse” always makes 
“Loyall Subjects of all Noble Spirits.”94
The part recounted so far constitutes the 
political realm in which Saturn and Mercury exist. 
Yet, writes Sadler, they are also “sometime Poeticall, 
sometime Platonicall, yea Chymicall sometime.”95 If 
we look to the poets, the quarrel stems from Saturn’s 
possession of Thule, a fact recounted in several of 
the “old Poets and Poeticall writers.”96 While the 
poets make a claim for Saturn’s possession of Thule, 
the “chymists” explain why it should belong to 
Mercury. Of all the planets, Mercury has the greatest 
latitude from “Ecliptick, which is the SUNS constant 
Residence.” Therefore, it seems to be a good fit for 
places, such as Thule with “Climes, which are most 
Remote and distant from the SUN.”97 Similarly, 
Mercury is cold and moist and, therefore, “fittest to 
reside in Cold Moyst Ilands; Such as THULE.”98 For 
Sadler, the platonic writers go a step further than the 
xxiv  In early modern European maps and literature, Thule represents a 
region far north now variously identified as Norway, Orkney, and Shetland 
(archipelago off the coast of Scotland). 
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poets and the chemists. Rather than simply telling 
us about the roots of the quarrel between Saturn 
and Mercury, the Platonists found a way to reconcile 
them in “Words and Shew (show)”, even though 
“SATURN and MERCURY could in re, never agree 
in Heav’n or Earth.”99
In making this case, Sadler displays a strong 
familiarity with the main doctrines of Plato and 
his leading interpreter Plotinus. However, before 
we delve further into Sadler’s thought, it is, even if 
somewhat crudely, worth stating Plotinus’s theory 
of the three hypostases, a formulation central to 
Sadler’s exploration of the relationship between 
different heavenly bodies. According to Plotinus, 
three principles or hypostases are fundamental to 
everything we experience. These are the One (Plato’s 
form of the good), Intellect (or Being, together with 
all beings or intellects) and the Soul (or, as Corrigan 
puts it, “all soul from which at a lower level the 
World soul and individual souls derive”).100 The 
three principles are largely hierarchical. From the 
One emanate the Intellect or Being and then comes 
Soul. Just like the Soul reflects the Intellect, the 
physical world, comprised of form and matter, is a 
reflection or image of the Soul. However, it is worth 
remembering that the Intellect and Soul here are not 
our intellects or souls. Rather, they represent higher 
principles from which our more feeble and inferior 
intellect and souls derive.101
If not an exact representation of Plotinus’s 
theory, Sadler’s formulation is a relatively close 
approximation. Echoing Plotinus, Sadler begins 
with how Celius, Saturn, and Jupiter—the “Three 
Highest Planets in Heaven”—represent the three 
hypostases to the Platonists. Celius represents being, 
Saturn stands for knowledge, and Jupiter for activity. 
The three spheres exist in our own souls and, in the 
language of the scholastics, respectively represent 
essence, understanding, and will.102 As the sphere of 
being, Celius is all knowing, supreme, and infinite. 
“Celius must have,” Sadler writes, “in himself all 
Entity; (else not Infinite) all perfections; Therefore 
Knowledge, He must be Intelligent. And Having 
All within Himself, He Cannot but know all.”103 To 
express it in terms of Plotinus, Celius represents 
the One, which is the origin of all things. Coming 
next, Saturn represents the sphere of knowledge or 
understanding. From Saturn emerge the ideas or 
concepts that are then stamped upon “Severall Lumps 
of Matter (as on Wax).”104 Sadler is careful to reiterate 
Plotinus’s idea of one hypostasis being a reflection of 
the other. Even before these ideas were stamped on 
matter, they were “Swallowed by SATURN Himself.” 
Only then did they come out again, divided and 
broken to “beget Forms; of which came This Fabrick, 
which we call the WORLD.”105
Where does Jupiter stand in relation to 
Saturn? Jupiter, writes Sadler, is the third hypostasis 
representing activity or will. It functions as the 
medium through which Saturn made the world. 
Jupiter takes Saturn’s ideas and stamps them 
upon “rude indigested Moles of Matter.” If Saturn 
represents the “Ideal Cause,” according to which 
the world was made, Jupiter is “The Immediate 
Cause By whomxxv the world was made.”106 In other 
words, Saturn provides the blueprint that Jupiter 
later executes to create the physical world. The link 
between Saturn and Jupiter is further explored 
through the notions of will and understanding. 
Even if the will follows understanding’s dictates, 
Saturn (understanding) and Jupiter (activity or will) 
are two branches of the same tree. If one thinks of 
“that Terrean Soule, that lump of living…Flesh, 
which we call our Heart,” Understanding is the 
“Soule’s Diastole,” and will its systole. Both will and 
understanding “make up but One Heart, One Soule.” 
107In arguing thus, Sadler again follows Plotinus’s 
notion of all things emanating from the One and 
comprising an essential unity.
Last, we come to Mercury—the subject of 
investigation throughout the masque. Sadler repeats 
how Saturn provides the ideas which Jupiter stamps 
upon matter. But the “words, Syllables and Letters” 
by which Saturn’s ideas or concepts come out and 
are expressed, belong to Mercury. Employing the 
metaphor of reproduction, he notes that “MERCURY 
to SATURN, is Semen Ideale (Ideal seed): That Vis 
Prolifica (Reproductive Force), by which Ideahs 
(sic) coming out of SATURN, and STAMPT by 
JUPITER, on Matter; do there beget the Embryon 
of a Forme….”108 In other words, Mercury acts as 
the force of reproduction that is impressed on the 
building material that Jupiter uses to shape Saturn’s 
ideas into physical reality. Therefore, one need not 
assume that Saturn and Mercury are necessarily 
opposed to each other. In fact, drawing upon Platonic 
writers, as Sadler does, it is easy to see how the two 
xxv  Unless noted otherwise, the italics are in the original. 
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are linked to each other as parts of a larger, coherent 
system.
Sadler’s acceptance of Platonic ideas, however, 
is far from uncritical. He was troubled by the sheer 
infinitude of things suggested by the Platonists. 
When discussing Jupiter, he notes how “All Nations 
say that Jupiter made the world. The Platonists, 
however, modify the assertion by suggesting that, 
“Twas Made by chusing Some…Ideahs out of 
SATURN.” The important thing for the Platonists, he 
emphasizes, is “Some Ideahs” because, due to their 
infinity, “all could not come forth.”109 Sadler finds 
this incomprehensible for two reasons. First, he asks, 
how is it possible that there are infinite individuals in 
each species, the species themselves are infinite but, 
at the end, there is only “One Infinite”? Second, given 
that the infinite species differ in terms of the “Degrees 
of Entity”, and the last Species must itself have infinite 
degrees of entity, it is inconceivable, even for the 
divine mind, to come to a point where something 
definite and worth producing can ever be picked out 
of this vast multiplicity.110 
In Rights of the Kingdom, Sadler brought these 
Platonic ideas to bear upon his understanding of 
reason. Asking what is reason, he disagreed with 
schoolmen or scholastics who defined reason solely 
as “discourse.” The word reason, he wrote, was 
first used with regard to the idea of proportion in 
mathematics, “Mother of all Analogy, and of most 
Learning to the Ancients.” 111Therefore, rational 
agents were those who acted in proportion. xxvi This 
xxvi  Interestingly, Sadler’s definition of reason, in spite of their different 
intents, closely resembles the one presented by Thomas Hobbes two years 
later in Leviathan (1651). The passage is worth quoting in full. In Chapter 
V, “Of Reason and Science,” Hobbes writes: “When a man reasoneth he does 
nothing else but conceive a sum total, from addition of parcels, or conceive a 
remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another; which (if it be done by 
words) is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts to the 
name of the whole, or from the names of the whole and one part to the name 
of the other part. And, though in some things (as in numbers) besides adding 
and subtracting men name other operations, as multiplying and dividing, yet 
they are the same; for multiplication is but adding together of things equal, 
and division, but subtracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations 
are not incident to numbers only, but to all manner of things that can be added 
together and taken one out of another. For as arithmeticians teach to add and 
subtract in numbers, so the geometricians teach the same in lines, figures (solid 
and superficial), angles, proportions, times, degrees of swiftness, force, power 
and the like; the logicians teach the same in consequences of words, adding 
together two names to make an affirmation, and two affirmations to make a 
syllogism; and many syllogisms to make a demonstration; and from the sum, 
or conclusion, of a syllogism they subtract one proposition to find the other. 
Writers of politics add together pactions to find men’s duties, and lawyers laws 
and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In sum, 
in what matter soever there is place for addition and subtraction there also 
is place for reason, and where these have no place, there reason has nothing 
at all to do.” (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan with selected variants from the 
Latin edition of 1668. Edited, with Introduction and Notes by Edwin Curley 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), V, [1]). I am thankful 
to Professor Adrian Johns for this reference. 
definition comes straight from Aristotle. As Sadler 
notes, the “same old Philosopher” who thought that 
God always acts in geometrical proportion also 
thought reason always lies in the mean between two 
ends or objects, as evidenced by his argument that 
virtue is a “mean proportion.”112 However, to Sadler, 
this explanation seemed far from sufficient. It raised 
more questions than it answered. For instance, what 
exactly is this “proportion” that makes one rational? 
Does it lie between the actor and the object? How 
does it differentiate rational agents from “natural 
agents?”113
To answer these questions, Sadler returned to 
the Platonic ideas of activity, knowledge and being, 
articulated earlier in Masquarade Du Ciel (1640). 
Rational agents, he argued, strike this “more inward 
Proportion” only when their activity is proportional 
to their being and their knowing. Reason, therefore, 
lies in striking the adequate balance between one’s 
activity, being and knowledge. Sadler offered the 
following logic for this proposition: God’s being, 
knowing and activity are infinite and, hence, 
proportional. God is also absolutely free. Through his 
knowledge, he freely comprehends. By his activity, 
he freely diffuses his being. This diffusion of being 
is such that “all the creatures seem as several Rayes, 
or Ideas (rightly called Species).”114 All creatures 
have some image of the Creator’s being and activity. 
Consequently, since creatures emanate from God, 
what is true of God is also true of the creatures. If 
such proportion constitutes reason in God, it follows 
that humans too should strike a balance between 
their being, knowing, and acting to be deemed 
rational.
In a text that is meant to present the “rights of 
the kingdom” with reference to nearly two thousand 
years of English history, this complicated discussion 
appears to be a digression. Not surprisingly, Sadler 
himself considers this to be the case. However, 
in order to justify the discussion, Sadler turns 
the reader’s attention back to the question of law. 
The long and complex discussion of reason, write 
Sadler, is essential because “our Law doth so adore 
right Reason.” In fact, what is contrary to reason is 
contrary to law.115 Equated thus, reason becomes 
the essence of law. Everything that the common law 
mandates is thereby made reasonable. For instance, a 
“tenant at will,” when ejected by his Lord, is protected 
by the common law, which requires that the tenant 
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have reasonable time to remove his family and goods, 
“with free Egress and Regress.” Similarly, a “tenant 
by copy” is never entirely subject to the Lord’s whim 
because, by common law, the Lord must have always 
levy a reasonable fine.” Last, common law requires 
that:
Houseboot, Hedgboot, Ploughboot, all Estovers 
(both for Tenants and Prisoners) must be 
reasonable, and so must all Partitions between 
Parceners, and upon Elegit, &c. Which are 
therefore not left to the Sole Pleasure of a Sheriff, 
or of any other, but in a sworn Enquest, as we 
may find in the Writ de Rationabili Partitione.116
Unsurprisingly, at some points, Sadler repeats 
the arguments of those with a solely Aristotelian 
understanding of reason and its relation to common 
law. For example, like Justice Coke, Sadler argues 
that it is mostly the lawyers and judges who have the 
ability to determine what is reasonable when it comes 
to matters of the Law. Nonetheless, he concedes 
that there may be cases when the Law itself “leaveth 
private Men (even in their own Causes) to be Judges 
of Reason, or what is reasonable.” One such case is 
that of escuage: the payment made to a lord in lieu of 
military service. In cases relating to escuage, a man’s 
own reason is sufficient to determine the outcome.117 
The Law need not intervene. There could be other 
exceptions as well. However, in general, if we are 
to ask who must determine what is reasonable, the 
simple answer is that when a man finds himself 
troubled by his Lord, or his fellow tenants, he must 
go to the lawyers and the judges. The “Judges Breast” 
is a “Castle for right Reason.”118
The similarity between Coke and Sadler, 
however, is a minor one. It certainly does not obscure 
the fact (owing to his intellectual background) that 
Sadler had come to think of reason very differently 
from his predecessors. While Coke and various 
others followed an Aristotelian understanding 
of reason, Sadler leaned towards the Platonic 
alternative. For proponents of “artificial reason,” the 
strength of common law lay in the technical expertise 
of its practitioners acquired through the study of 
Year Books and Reports. Sadler, on the other hand, 
felt that there was more to the practice of common 
law. Instead of suggesting that it was the diligent 
study of old documents that lent common law its 
reasonableness, Sadler argued that it was the ability of 
judges and lawyers to strike a balance between their 
activity, being, and knowledge that made common 
law reasonable. For Sadler, therefore, common 
law stood for the exercise of a type of reason that 
mimicked God’s infinite and proportional being, 
knowing, and activity.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
at least one major recent work of 
scholarship has emphasized the dominance of 
Aristotelian thought amongst common lawyers in the 
seventeenth century. The effect, however, has been 
to portray common law as untouched by the radical 
intellectual transformations of the period. By looking 
at a figure like Sadler, this section has attempted to 
argue that this was not the case. As several thinkers 
grew dissatisfied with Aristotelian scholasticism, 
they made their way into Platonism. A member 
of the Cambridge Platonists, the most influential 
group of Platonic thinkers in seventeenth-century 
England, Sadler also took to Platonism as a way to 
resolve intellectual problems. One such problem 
was the concept of reason as it related to common 
law. Moving away from Justice Edward Coke’s 
Aristotelian concept of “artificial reason,” Sadler 
developed a more Platonic view of reason. In doing 
so, he conceptualized common law not as the use of 
technical knowledge gathered through diligent study 
but as an exercise of the Platonic variety of reason.
CONCLUSION 
It is fitting to end by suggesting directions for 
further research. First, in thinking about common 
law and religion, it would be suitable to go back to 
Justices Edward Coke and Matthew Hale to connect 
their religious views with their ideas about common 
law. This exercise might change our interpretation 
of their writings and their impact on the subsequent 
generations of common lawyers. Second, due to 
the lack of substantive evidence, I have hesitated to 
draw a strong connection between Sadler’s religious 
views and his idea of reason. I have only hinted at 
such a connection by pointing out the role of the 
Divine in Sadler’s conception of reason. In pursuing 
this connection further, we should move away from 
Sadler and try to look at other common lawyers 
to understand the nature of this link better and 
construct an even more comprehensive picture of 
common law by linking common law, reason, and 
religion together.
Yet, as this essay has suggested, these avenues 
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can only be pursued if we appreciate two main 
arguments about common law in Early Modern 
England. First, as exemplified through Sadler, it 
is unwise to segregate religion and common law. 
Integrating the two is a much more productive 
approach. It allows us to appreciate common law’s 
relationship with the most potent factor in Early 
Modern life and explain why certain legal thinkers 
took the positions they did. Second, by ignoring 
the seismic intellectual changes of the period, we 
run the risk of portraying common law as static. By 
appreciating the influence of ideas such as Platonism, 
we can fully highlight the truly dynamic nature of 
Early Modern legal and intellectual culture. 
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